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 The proliferation of images in and of law lends itself to surprisingly complex 
problems of epistemology and power.1 Understanding through images is innate; most 
of us easily understand images without thinking. But arriving at mutually agreeable 
understandings of images is also difficult. Translating images into shared words 
leads to multiple problems inherent in translation and that pose problems for justice. 
Because images are inherently “what we know” (because they are “what we see”), 
insofar as most of us process our experiences first through sight, images do not 
naturally lend themselves to linguistic translation. We don’t believe they require 
translation because we are so sure of what we see, and yet comparing and sharing 
understandings of images requires communication through words. Despite our 
saturated imagistic culture, we have not established methods to pursue that 
translation process with confidence.
 Translating images into words in order to compare them to what we understand 
through sight is a troubling problem for law. We need to be sure of the facts contained 
in the image, the relevance of the image, its perspective and potential bias, its 
partiality, and its ambiguities. And yet images do not lend themselves to a good “fit” 
between inherent knowledge and descriptive or analytical language of legal evidence 
and evaluation. This problem of fit (turning facts into knowledge into judgment) is 
what law attempts to accomplish. Justice is a question of proportionality and fit, 
which is a matter of sharing common understandings. With images, given their 
inscrutability (or their mistaken total scrutability),2 we cannot be sure if mutual 
understanding has been achieved, especially if we simply rely on our innate sense of 
“what we see” to do the job of building consensus. Without a language on which we 
can agree to describe the images upon which law and legal process increasingly rely 
to adjudicate disputes, law and justice will remain an unspoken endeavor. 
Transparency and fairness are hallmarks of our justice system. If we cannot be clear 
about the manner in which we interpret and use images in the pursuit of justice, and 
if we fail to justify our interpretive choices, we undermine the system’s procedures 
and corrupt its ends. Images do not speak for themselves. Advocates (and audiences, 
be they juries or judges) speak for them. With images quickly becoming the common 
currency in legal knowledge, we must learn to scrutinize images in language we can 
each understand and upon which we can each agree.
II. THE INSCRUTABILITY OF IMAGERY
 How are images inscrutable? Professor Jennifer Mnookin has recently written an 
essay on just this subject—what she calls “semi-legibility”—building on writing and 
1. Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1257 (2010) (exploring the 
polysemic nature of photographs and film in legal situations that demand truth-seeking).
2. See Jennifer Mnookin, Semi-Legibility and Visual Evidence: An Initial Exploration, J.L. Culture & 
Human. (2012) [hereinafter Mnookin, Semi-Legibility and Visual Evidence].
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research on which she and I have worked for nearly a decade.3 Mnookin’s recent 
article in the Journal of Law, Culture and Humanities provides a template for thinking 
about semi-legible images in legal disputes.4 The concept of “semi-legibility usefully 
focuses our attention on the ways that much visual evidence neither speaks for itself 
nor permits unbounded interpretations, but rather, has a range of plausible—and 
potentially inconsistent—readings.” Mnookin’s goal, as she puts it, is to invite us “to 
look at the strategies . . . by which those who make use of visual evidence—from the 
lawyers who introduce it, to the experts who explain it, to the jurors who assess it—
work to read meaning into ambiguous evidence and make it into proof.”5
 Examples of inscrutable images are everywhere once you look for them, from the 
most popular to the most mundane. The images of the Zapruder film (fig. 1), capturing 
3. Id.; see Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 Yale 
J.L. & Human. 1 (1998); Jessica Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House and the Genre of Documentary 
Film, 29 Colum. J.L. & Arts 107 (2005) [hereinafter Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House] (observing 
that film is increasingly being used as a policing tool to monitor police and suspect interactions because it 
appears to provide an objective and unambiguous representation of past events); Jessica Silbey, Judges as 
Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 493 (2004) [hereinafter Silbey, 
Judges as Film Critics] (describing a variety of film evidence and the problems and contradictions that 
occur when judges unconsciously act as film critics when determining the admissibility and weight of 
film evidence); see also Jessica Silbey, Criminal Performances: Film, Autobiography, and Confession, 37 N.M. 
L. Rev. 189, 218–40 (2007) [hereinafter Silbey, Criminal Performances] (discussing the filming of 
criminal confessions in particular).





images from a particular perspective of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,6 
are notoriously ambiguous concerning the issue for which people inspect them: Who 
killed JFK? We may watch these films over and over, witness the violence and horror 
of the moments, but in doing so we know no more or less about the mysteries of the 
shooter and his mechanism. The photograph of Sabrina Harman (fig. 2) in Abu Ghraib 
giving a thumbs-up over an Iraqi corpse is equally inscrutable.7
We know who she is (and eventually who the corpse is) because of witness testimony 
after the fact, but what does this photograph tell us of the conditions at Abu Ghraib, 
who was responsible for those conditions, and the fate of the dead man in the 
photograph? We can speculate (and that is exactly what happened) based on our first 
impression of this gruesome and cavalier image, but what we “know” that is relevant 
to the questions of accountability and retribution remains debatable.8
 What about an everyday image from a surveillance camera at a bank that captures 
a moment (or set of moments) during a robbery? What can we say we “know” about the 
6. Frame-by-Frame Images of the Abraham Zapruder Film, Assassination Research, http://
assassinationresearch.com/v2n2/zfilm/zframe001.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (follow hyperlink 
for frames 303 to 319 of film).
7. Errol Morris, Believing Is Seeing (Observations on the Mysteries of Photography) 109 
(2011). The photograph was taken of Sabrina Harman and a deceased Iraqi prisoner by Army Specialist 
Charles Graner on November 4, 2003 while on duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq. Id. at 97–113.
8. Id. at 111–12.
FIGURE 2
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crime and its perpetrators from an image taken from an automated camera, hanging 
from a ceiling, unfocused but nonetheless capturing images from the robbery in 
progress? We might know the relative size and shape of some of the thieves, we may 
know what they were wearing, but we don’t know how many thieves there are in total, 
we don’t see their faces without significant technological enhancements, we don’t know 
how many weapons were in use, we don’t know whether the weapons on camera are 
real or fake. Left with questions about what we are seeing (especially when the images 
are unfocused, impartial, and out of context as so many are), we are left with further 
questions about the significance of the images for the legal issues at hand.
 Some images require expert interpretation, such as images of fMRI scans or 
x-rays.9 In such cases, we acknowledge that these images are inscrutable without a 
translator. We call the translator “an expert,” one who understands the science behind 
the evidentiary image. That expert/translator must also engage in an additional 
translation, however, of not only the science that produces the image for us to 
collectively view, but also of the image itself, pointing to or explaining certain parts 
of the images as more relevant than others.
 Some images are so notorious that we cannot fathom the dispute they may generate. 
Consider the famous pictures of Abraham Lincoln reprinted here (fig. 3).
9. Neal Feigenson & Christine Spiesel, Law on Display: The Digital Transformation of Legal 




It is a doctored photograph of Lincoln’s head on John Calhoun’s body.10 Only an expert 
on digital images (or a civil war historian) would know this.11 Despite having seen this 
photograph in history textbooks for decades and “knowing” it to be Abraham Lincoln, 
we are not “seeing” Abraham Lincoln as he was photographed. We are seeing a collage 
of at least two photographs together forming a political and ironic statement about 
Lincoln’s legacy in light of his political competitor John Calhoun.
 An image of an in-utero fetus produces a similar feeling of familiarity and 
potential strangeness. We know what we are seeing generally speaking, but what is 
its significance? How old is this fetus? In whose body is it? The ultrasound output of 
a fetus twitching and rolling in a mother’s uterus is increasingly shown on legislative 
f loors to add evidence to the constitutional debate on abortion. But what kind of 
evidence does this film provide? What is its factual or legal significance? Does this 
photograph help answer the legal question of whether a fetal life is constitutionally 
protected against any or all maternal choices, from drinking wine to terminating the 
pregnancy pre-viability?
 The inherent inscrutability of film and photographic images may be no different 
from the inscrutability of written text or oratory, the critical evaluation of text and 
oratory being an academic study of longstanding. And yet we have not yet developed 
a regular habit of being skeptical of film and photographic images used as 
demonstrative or substantive evidence in legal settings.12 Photographic or film 
images, when put at issue in a lawsuit, should be subject to the same level of scrutiny 
(if not more) than testimonial and documentary evidence, the goal of the scrutiny 
being to test the message for which its proponent asserts the film or photograph 
stands. Doing so will generate multiple interpretations of the film or photograph, 
confirming the nature of images as inherently polysemous. This will also confirm 
the long-standing theoretical perspective in film and literary studies that audiences 
(and readers) generate significance for the film and literature as much as (or more 
than) the images and texts themselves generate meaning. The image of the in-utero 
fetus means different things depending on the context in which the image is situated 
and the argument it is being used to advance. In a trial on the constitutionality of the 
requirement that women seeking abortions be shown an ultrasound image of the 
fetus in their uterus, the ultrasound image can stand for competing sides of the 
debate: (1) that a fetus with a beating heart lives inside the woman and cannot be 
killed; and (2) that a first-term fetus is so underdeveloped and dependent on the 
woman’s body to survive that it is unrecognizable as human and inseparable from the 
woman: a part of her body itself.
10. The photograph is circa 1860, creator unknown; see Hany Farid, Digital Doctoring: Can We Trust 
Photographs?, in Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating 95, 97–98 (Brooke 
Harrington ed., 2009), available at http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/farid/publications/deception09.pdf. 
[hereinafter Farid, Digital Doctoring]; see also Hany Farid, Photography Changes What We Are Willing to 
Believe, Click!, http://click.si.edu/Story.aspx?story=178 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
11. See Farid, Digital Doctoring, supra note 10.
12. See Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 17 (2008) 
[hereinafter Silbey, Cross-Examining Film]; see also Silbey, Judges as Film Critics, supra note 3, at 570–71.
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 Despite the proliferation of film as a basic tool of communication in our digital 
age, it remains rare to hear of legal scholarship, case law, and legislative initiatives 
analyzing film’s role as a legal tool or constitutive part of legal culture. Why is this? 
One reason may be because lawyers and judges are word people and not picture 
people. Thinking in terms of images as building blocks for legal arguments is not 
how lawyers and judges are trained. We might use chalk to diagram a room or a 
chase. We might use photographs to identify suspects. But the nuts and bolts of law 
study and practice are words, not pictures. Another reason may be that too many 
lawyers and judges (ironically enough) believe images are less precise than words. We 
are uncomfortable with the maxim that “a picture is worth a thousand words.” Which 
words? And how can I shape them, direct them, cross-examine them? This is 
precisely the right worry to have.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND FILM IMAGERY
 The field of law and film has grown in the past ten to fifteen years. Roughly, the 
field has three overlapping foci. There is the “law-in-film” scholarship, which began as 
a study of law’s popular forms in cinema and television and is primarily concerned with 
the ways in which law and legal processes are represented in popular forms.13 This 
“law-in-film” approach considers film and television as a jurisprudential text and asks 
how law should or should not regulate and order our worlds by critiquing the way it 
does so in the film or television show.14 Studies of film (e.g., Twelve Angry Men) and 
television shows (e.g., Ally McBeal) proliferated in law journals over the past years.15
 There is also a “film-as-law” approach, which asks how films about law constitute 
a legal culture beyond the film. This approach pays special attention to film’s unique 
qualities as a medium and asks how its particular ways of world-making shape our 
expectations of law and justice in our world.16 Writings in the “film-as-law” vein 
13. See generally Anthony Chase, Movies on Trial: The Legal System on the Silver Screen (2002) 
(describing films about law as a vehicle to explore popular beliefs about law and politics); Legal Reelism: 
Movies as Legal Texts (John Denvir ed., 1996) (collection of essays discussing film stories about law).
14. See generally Orit Kamir, Framed: Women in Law and Film (2006) (reading “law films” as feminist 
critiques of power struggles in law to imagine a more inclusive, compassionate legal order).
15. See Law and Justice on The Small Screen (Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey eds., 2012) (a collection 
of essays on law and television); Jessica Silbey, The Politics of Law and Film Study: An Introduction to the 
Symposium on Legal Outsiders in American Film, 42 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 755 (2009) (articles collected 
from a symposium on law and film studies); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the 50th Anniversary of 12 
Angry Men, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 557 (2007) (introduction to two academic panels discussing the 
fiftieth anniversary of the film 12 Angry Men); Symposium, Picturing Justice: Images of Law & Lawyers 
in the Visual Media, 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 891 (1996); see also Diane Klein, Ally McBeal and Her Sisters: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Representations of Women Lawyers on Prime-Time Television, 18 
Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 259 (1998) (discussing portrayals of female lawyers on prime-time television).
16. See generally Cynthia Lucia, Framing Female Lawyers: Women on Trial in Film (2005) 
(showing how the genre of the female lawyer film both emboldens and undermines women’s authority 
in law and society); Rebecca Johnson, Leaving Normal: Constructing the Family at the Movies in Law, in 
New Perspectives on Deviance: The Construction of Deviance in Everyday Life 163 (Lori G. 
Beaman ed., 2000); Jessica Silbey, Patterns of Courtroom Justice, 28 J.L. & Soc’y 97 (2001).
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explore the rhetorical power of film form to affect popular legal consciousness.17 The 
focus is less on the story the film tells about law (the film’s plot) and more on the way 
it tells the story (the film’s form).18 This analysis more acutely centers on the particular 
way that film stories are differently embodied as visual representation and, therefore, 
how they differently embody their audience as judge or jury. This “film-as-law” 
scholarship explains “how viewers are actively positioned by film to identify with 
certain points of view; to see some groups of people as trustworthy, dangerous, 
disgusting, laughable; to experience some kinds of violence as normal; to see some 
lives as lightly expendable.”19 In this latter approach, film and law are compared as 
epistemological systems, formidable social practices that, when combined, are 
exceptionally effective in defining what we think we know, what we believe we 
should expect, and what we dare hope for in a society that promises ordered liberty.20
 The third focus of law and film scholarship concerns film as evidence. This area 
of research draws on “law-in-film” and “film-as-law” scholarship but considers the 
role of film more specifically in policing and dispute resolution settings.21 It asks how 
film is used as a legal tool and how it becomes an object of legal analysis in light of 
its history as a cultural object and art form. How does automated surveillance film 
become testimony in a court of law?22 How do cultural perceptions about film affect 
its evaluation by jurors, advocates, and judges?23 How might legal actors and lay 
citizens mobilize the audiovisual technology of our twenty-first century to further 
the promises of our justice system?24 In this sub-field, the history of film as 
entertainment and as an art form combines with the epistemological complexities 
inherent in this representational medium to explore the benefits and pitfalls of film’s 
role in shaping formal legal procedures.
 In addition to law and film studies, policy debates that surround televised 
courtroom proceedings and court television gained traction in the scholarly literature 
17. Silbey, supra note 16, at 97–98.
18. See generally Jennifer Mnookin, Reproducing a Trial: Evidence and Its Assessment in Paradise Lost, in Law 
on the Screen 153 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005); Jessica Silbey, A History of Representations of Justice: 
Coincident Preoccupations of Law and Film, in A Representation of Justice 131 (Antoine Masson & 
Kevin O’Connor eds., 2007) (comparing film and law as knowledge systems).
19. See Ruth Buchanan & Rebecca Johnson, Strange Encounters: Exploring Law and Film in the Affective 
Register, 46 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc’y 33, 34 (2009).
20. See Silbey, supra note 18.
21. See Silbey, Criminal Performances, supra note 3, at 194–97; Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra 
note 3, at 114–16; Silbey, Judges as Film Critics, supra note 3, at 500–02.
22. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics, supra note 3, at 515–20.
23. Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line Between Law and Popular 
Culture 107 (2000); Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 429, 431–32 (2006).
24. Feigenson & Spiesel, supra note 9, at 131–62.
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in the 1980s and 1990s.25 Reality television with a focus on law continues to interest 
legal scholars and media scholars.26 Policy debates circulate about the proper role of 
cameras in the courtroom, beginning with the Supreme Court case Estes v. Texas in 
196527 and culminating for many in the O.J. Simpson murder trial.28 This debate has 
become mundane for many us, and courts and legislators seem to understand the 
pros and cons of filming and filmmaking in the courtroom: its educative and 
distortive capacities.29 The debates continue about the disparate filming practices in 
the thousands of courtrooms around the country, particularly whether and how a 
court should allow filming to occur. Cameras in the courtroom are becoming more 
widespread throughout the United States, and yet the U.S. Supreme Court staunchly 
refuses to visually record its proceedings.30 We might ask ourselves why the Supreme 
Court has refused to open its proceedings to audiences beyond the physical 
courtroom. The Justices describe worries of “sound bites” and questions and answers 
reported “out of context,” of harm to the court’s reputation, and of undue influence 
on the advocates before the court. Do these concerns translate into the use of film 
and digital photography as evidentiary proffers more generally? Are the Justices onto 
something or resisting an inevitable future?31
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE INSCRUTABILITY OF IMAGERY ON LEGAL PRACTICE
 Across these varied subject areas of the “visualization of law,” scholars tend to 
write from two basic perspectives. The first critiques the images of law in popular 
visual forms, highlighting the disjunction between the stories and characters 
on-screen with the reality of legal practice. The concern here is that because image 
culture helps constitute law and legal culture, popular film representations may 
distort the law and its admirable purposes and processes. The persistent images of 
corrupt or incompetent judges (e.g., the films My Cousin Vinny or And Justice for 
All32), vicious and unethical lawyers (e.g., the HBO series Damages33), and the 
25. Angelique M. Paul, Turning the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About Real 
Law?, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 655 (1997); see also Marjorie Cohn & David Dow, Cameras in the 
Courtroom: Television and the Pursuit of Justice (2002).
26. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Judging Reality: Television Judges, in Law and Justice on the Small 
Screen 229, 230 (Peter Robson & Jessica Silbey eds., 2012).
27. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
28. Cohn & Dow, supra note 25, at 3–13; see also Sherwin, supra note 23, at 44–47, 162–63.
29. Cohn & Dow, supra note 25, at 14–25.
30. Id. at 39–61.
31. But see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), in which the Supreme Court held that a police-made 
videotape of a car chase from the dashboard of the police cruiser “captures” the event in dispute such 
that summary judgment should be decided in light of the facts depicted in the videotape. With this 
ruling, the Court appears unafraid of “sound bites” and filmed events taken out of context in policy 
brutality cases, but still afraid of this problem for filming their own oral arguments.
32. See My Cousin Vinny (Twentieth Century Fox 1992); And Justice for All (Columbia Pictures 1979).
33. See Damages (Fox Entertainment Group 2007).
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dominance and infallibility of scientific evidence (e.g., the television show CSI: Crime 
Scene Investigation34) devastate the reputation of our legal system and our faith in the 
rule of law. Furthermore, false representations of legal process—that trials are 
common, cross examination is always earth-shattering (e.g., A Few Good Men35), and 
lawyers are dramatic and heroic (e.g., To Kill a Mockingbird36)—lead to disappointment 
in one’s own personal experience with legal disputes. This creates false expectations 
and, some suggest, vigilantism or a nihilistic view of the profession and our legal 
system. For scholars writing in this vein, their focus is to realign the popular 
expectations of law with the activity of legal adjudication, to demystify legal practice, 
and to develop a critical attitude toward popular cultural representations. This 
scholarship urges that we become smarter consumers of popular legal culture for the 
purpose of educating our students, juries, and clients.
 Related to this form of scholarship about images in law is the critical investigation 
of the cultural representations of law for what they teach us about law’s history and 
future promise. Many films about law question the balance of power between the 
individual and institutions (legal and non-governmental) as it relates to gender 
equality (e.g., North Country37), tort reform (e.g., Erin Brockovich,38 A Civil Action39) or 
race relations (e.g., A Time to Kill40). These films about law are often based on true 
stories, strengthening their message about equal justice and the need for social 
change.41 Consider also the surge of documentary film as a popular cinematic genre 
and that many of the documentary films are about law and policy.42 This has been 
further material for this area of scholarship on the intersection between popular 
culture and legal institutions.
 In comparison to images of law, many scholars also write about images in law—
literally in law, such as surveillance film, filmed confessions, or other forms of 
photographic or filmic evidence and argument.43 These scholars accept that film 
images are part of our present and future ways of making sense of our world. As 
such, we must learn how they work, how they are variously used, and the benefits 
and drawbacks of their widespread use. The question for this scholarly trajectory is 
not “what is the content of the image?” or “what does it mean?” but “how is it 
meaningful within the legal process?” Further questions around which this kind of 
34. See CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS Television 2000).
35. See A Few Good Men (Castle Rock Entertainment 1992).
36. See To Kill a Mockingbird (Alan J. Pakula 1962).
37. See North Country (Warner Bros. 2005).
38. See Erin Brockovich (Universal Pictures 2000).
39. See A Civil Action (Touchstone Pictures 1998).
40. See A Time to Kill (Warner Bros. 1996).
41. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 3, at 109–12.
42. Id. at 109–10 (discussing this trend).
43. Id.; see also Silbey, Criminal Performances, supra note 3; Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, supra note 3; 
Feigenson & Spiesel, supra note 9; Mnookin, Semi-Legibility and Visual Evidence, supra note 2.
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work centers are: “What are the imagistic mechanisms for conveying relevance and 
for persuading?” and “How do film and photography compare to other representational 
forms aimed at communicating and advocating?” For example, work on filmed 
confessions asks questions about the camera angle: whether the film frame focused 
equally on the defendant and interrogator and the time frame and sequencing of the 
confessional film evidence.44 Work on clemency videos and victim impact statements 
asks questions about the use of soundtracks, the propriety of the stylization of these 
biographical and autobiographical film forms, the acceptability of mixing factual 
stories (biography) with fictional genres (feature film), and the benefits and 
drawbacks of these persuasive film forms in legal proceedings where life and liberty 
are at stake.45
V. INTEGRATING THE STUDY OF IMAGERY INTO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
 In the scholarly arena that studies images in law, the goal is not to achieve 
realignment, as it is in many critiques of popular cultural images of law, but instead 
to practice translating images into the language and policies, of our legal system. 
These investigations enact critical interpretations of film, applying the learning of 
film studies (its history and form) to examine the complexity of film’s meanings and 
effect when used by legal advocates. This work encourages using well-established 
techniques of cross-examination and discovery to assess relevancy and prejudice of 
film evidence.46 It does not advocate abandoning film as a legal tool. To the contrary, 
this work creates a framework through which the evaluation and continued use of 
images in law can be accomplished in accordance with well-accepted legal principles 
of evidentiary and procedural fairness and access, but also on its own terms and 
alongside the strengths and weaknesses of other testimonial and documentary 
evidence. For example, in my own work on the varieties of film evidence, their 
treatment, and the importance of cross-examining film, I urge that discovery requests 
for outtakes and framing choices be made in both civil and criminal contexts.47 I also 
describe how lawyers and judges can more easily discern when film is not adequately 
being examined and when it is ambiguous. When advocates provide preambles to 
film images, they are demonstrating that the film requires some explanation. 48 And 
when lawyers ask leading questions of their witnesses who narrate film evidence, 
they are implying the film cannot speak for itself. 49 In both contexts, judges and 
44. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House, supra note 3, at 162 (citing studies by Daniel Lassiter).
45. See Regina Austin, Documentation, Documentary, and the Law: What Should Be Made of Victim Impact 
Videos?, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 979 (2010); I. Bennett Capers, Crime Music, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 749 
(2010).
46. Silbey, Cross Examining Film, supra note 12, at 41.
47. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics, supra note 3, at 561.
48. Silbey, Cross Examining Film, supra note 12, at 40–41.
49. Id. at 41.
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opposing counsel should be aware that the film has more than one perspective, is 
likely ambiguous, and its relevance (and interpretation) is in need of justification.
 The present symposium50 focused on the above-described range of scholarship on 
the “visualization of law.” Considering the future of legal scholarship in this area—
new trajectories for images of and in law—I cannot help but think about the variety 
of new legal subject areas in which images (both digital and analogue) are central. 
The billion-dollar video and online gaming industry (think about World of Warcraft 
or Second Life) is a field rich with legal battles ranging from privacy, contract, unfair 
business practices, intellectual property, and criminal law.51 Any dispute in each of 
these areas will have to reckon with how the games are played, how they are 
significant to their purchasers (the identities and communities they create and the 
passions they fuel), and the mechanisms of their commercial success. These questions, 
in turn, depend on parsing the relationship between the video or digital images—the 
virtual reality these games create—and the real world. This requires wrestling with 
some of the most deeply philosophical and humanistic inquiries about images 
themselves: the differences between representation and reality, the easy elision 
between them, and the historical insistence that differences between representation 
and reality be maintained.52 This is not to say that representation (be it verbal 
language or visual art) is not real or that it does not have real effects. It is to say that, 
when so much of our experience in the twenty-first century is through or via 
cyberspace, we might take care that our laws regulating both the physical world and 
the cyber world account for whatever differences distinguish them.
 The visualization of law is also apparent in the increased regulation and protection 
of data alongside the evolution of privacy law. As social networking sites become the 
modus operandi for communicating with professional and social peers, the issue of 
what information and images we make “public” and what we keep “private” and what 
information and images the webhosts own and control is of central concern. How our 
identities evolve on the web—how much control we maintain and how much control 
we must necessarily relinquish—will be closely tied to the existence of easy access to 
images of ourselves going about our daily life. What of an image search on Google’s 
search engine that turns up dozens of personal photographs that you were unaware 
were posted online? How, if at all, is this different from textual references to your 
personal or professional life? What of the competing need for surveillance and 
safety—in public parks, airports, or government buildings? Body scanners and 
surveillance cameras take photographs and film of a huge swath of everyday activity. 
How should we regulate that data? And should consideration be given to the fact that 
images (especially personal images) may be experienced as more private and their 
distribution as more invasive than other forms of surveillance and data collection?
50. Symposium, Visualizing Law in the Digital Age, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (2012–2013).
51. See generally Greg Lastowka, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds (2010).
52. See generally Ernst H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial 
Representation (1960).
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 Intellectual property is another area of law increasingly becoming the subject of 
public debate. Its obvious value in business, education, and research—all of which 
are required for continued national growth and prosperity—has made it the subject 
of recent and hotly contested legislative initiatives.53 Although much intellectual 
property is not image-based, much of it is—especially as seen recently in well-known 
cases, such as the Shepherd Fairey copyright lawsuit concerning the Obama/Hope 
poster and the high-fashion Louboutin shoe trademark case.54 It is remarkable how 
much of intellectual property is about the visual sense and yet how little intellectual 
property law considers the epistemology of the image.55
 Finally, moving images are making their way into constitutional debates. As 
mentioned above, ultrasound films of pre-viable fetuses and fMRI images of brain 
activity purport to shed light on debates about abortion and end of life decisions. 
These images are used rhetorically on the legislative f loor to prove the humanity of 
the unborn fetus and the inviolability of a terminally ill person based on brain 
function. The images may also be mandated by law, as in some states that require 
doctors show their patients a fetal ultrasound before terminating a pregnancy. 
Understanding how these images work (or fail) to persuade and how they convey 
factual (or misleading) information is necessary if we are to fully engage the legal 
and social dimensions of these pressing national issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
 In the near future, it might be helpful if within the field of the visualization of 
law we develop a taxonomy of the various strategies of visualization, how they occur 
in our society generally, and how they are embedded in diverse legal contexts 
specifically. Beyond the usual suspects of visualization and law—e.g., criminal law 
and popular culture—we would be wise to consider how images in and of law are 
hardly exceptional but instead are diffuse and complex—like language itself. For this 
reason, aesthetic and cultural theory based on the image must be at the center of law 
teaching and practice today.
53. See Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Protect Intellectual Property Act 
(PIPA) Protect Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. § 3(d)(2)(D) (2011); see also 
Sopastrike, http://sopastrike.com (last visited June 13, 2012).
54. Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues the A.P. Over Obama Image, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2009 at C1; Christian 
Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y 2011).
55. A notable exception to this is Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and 
Advertising Law, 48 Houston L. Rev. 862 (2011); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: 
The Images of Copyright, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (2012).
